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STATE LIQUOR CONTROL BOARDS V. LOCAL
GOVERNMENT: WHO SHOULD CONTROL THE LOCATION
OF LIQUOR ESTABLISHMENTS?

Thomas J. Madigan*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The "local tavern"-the term conjures visions of heated debates
over who is the most prolific hitter of all-time, Ty Cobb or Pete
Rose, and of a tall cold one in the company of friends at the end
of a hectic day. The local tavern is a venerable institution, a piece
of Americana that continues to thrive in many communities today.
Yet the local watering hole is not always a source of community
pride and joy.
The "problem" bar is a growing occurrence. Traffic hazards,
noise, drugs, prostitution and growing criminal activity, declining
property values, and disruption of the ,original "character of the
neighborhood" are all problems cited by community and neighborhood groups when fighting to oust a "problem" bar.' Moreover,
whether or not a bar is truly a "problem", in the sense that it can
actually be shown to foster crime, devalue surrounding property, or
otherwise pose a threat to the serenity of the neighborhood, is largely
irrelevant. The fact that local residents perceive the bar to cause
these problems is really the problem itself. This perception encourages
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1. A recent example of such a struggle is the Bloomfield Area Citizen's
Council's attempt to keep the Fantastic Plastic Bottle Club out of its neighborhood.
Their efforts produced three Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court cases: Fantastic
Plastic Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 16 Pa. Commw. 455, 332 A.2d 577
(1975), in which the City of Pittsburgh tried unsuccessfully to zone the Bottle Club
out through the denial of a special exception; Fantastic Plastic Inc. v. Flaherty, 26
Pa. Commw. 11, 361 A.2d 489 (1976), in which the City denied the Club a dancing
hall license; and Fantastic Plastic Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 32 Pa. Commw. 41,
377 A.2d 1051 (1977), in which the City's ordinance prohibiting bottle clubs was
struck down as an improper regulation of the sale of liquor.
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residents and businesses alike to move out of the neighborhood. As
a result, local efforts to revitalize an economically depressed area or
to reinstall community pride can be severely hampered. The existence
of a "problem" bar can be the result of poor planning in its original
placement, or the result of changes brought on by economic decline.
In addition, a non-problem bar can still be an inappropriate land
use in certain areas of a community. Zoning an area "liquor free"
may be a legitimate public policy decision for any number of reasons:
to cut down on litter in public parks and other open spaces; to help
prevent drunk driving in predominantly residential areas, or on main
thoroughfares; or to comfort elderly residents in older neighborhoods
where rising crime rates have become a concern. It is difficult to
argue that any of these reasons are not proper motivation for the
exercise of a local government's police power in the nature of zoning.
All are obviously intended to protect the health, safety, morals or
welfare of the local citizenry. Moreover, the nature of these decisions
and their highly localized effect suggest that they are best left to the
local governing body, whose officials are familiar with, and accountable to, those whom the regulations are intended to benefit.
Yet, the Pennsylvania Legislature and courts have not adopted this
view. The Pennsylvania Liquor Code 2 places exclusive responsibility
for the regulation of virtually every aspect of the liquor industry,
including the location of liquor establishments, in the hands of an
independent state agency, the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board.3
The Liquor Code and the Liquor Control Board expired at the
end of 1986 by operation of the Sunset Act, which provides for
periodic expiration and reenactment of most of Pennsylvania's regulatory acts and agencies.4 A great political debate took place over
the expiration and reenactment of the Liquor Code. Opponents of
the Act sought its abolition and the privitization of the sale of liquor
in the Commonwealth. Those in favor of abolishing the Act argued
that the system of state owned and operated liquor stores and limited
availability of retail beer sales was a disservice to the consumer. They
argued that prices were cheaper and the selection greater in neighboring states such as New York and Maryland where liquor can be

2.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47 (Purdon 1969 and Supp. 1987).
3. Id. at § 2-207.
4. The Sunset Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1795.6 (Purdon Supp. 1987).
The purpose of the Act is to force review and revision of Pennsylvania's regulatory
laws and agencies on a periodic basis.
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purchased in private liquor stores and beer is available in convenience
markets.
The Pennsylvania Legislature reenacted the Liquor Code during its
171st regular session.5 In addition to continuing the Liquor Control
Board, the Code did not change the regulatory system of state owned
and operated liquor stores nor the limited retail sale of brewed and
malt beverages, however, the old regulatory system was amended to
provide for an enforcement agency independent of the Liquor Control
Board. 6 In an apparent attempt to respond to the complaints of
consumer advocate groups, the Legislature also created a Bureau of
Consumer Relations. 7 Otherwise, the Liquor Code was reenacted
without substantial change.'
This article is intended to expose the undesirable results that have
come with the Liquor Control Board's usurpation of local governments' power to regulate the location of liquor establishments within
their boundaries. The Code, as reenacted, continues to vest exclusive
licensing power in the Liquor Control Board. It also continues to
deny local governments the power to regulate the location of licensed
liquor establishments.tThe purpose of this article to highlight the problems that come
with the state level regulation of the location of liquor establishments.
In order to do this, a brief examination of those portions of the
Pennsylvania Liquor Code that provide the basis for the preemption
of local land use regulation is necessary. 9 After a criticism of this
aspect of the Act, alternative regulatory systems will be surveyed,
with special emphasis on the extent to which local control over
licensed premises is facilitated. The objective of this survey is to
suggest a framework for a regulatory scheme to replace the current
Pennsylvania Liquor Code, one which would provide for more local
control over the location of liquor establishments and alleviate many
of the problems associated with Pennsylvania's current system.
Although much of this article focuses exclusively on Pennsylvania
law, its general analysis is useful in assessing the relative merits of

5. 1987 Pa. Legis. Serv. 21 et seq. (Purdon).
6. Id. at § 211.
7. Id. at § 213.
8. Amendments and revisions to the Code will be noted where relevant to
the discussion at hand. Otherwise, it should be assumed that the sections of the
Code under consideration were reenacted without significant amendment.
9. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §§ 4-404, 4-461, and 4-464 (Purdon 1969 and
Supp. 1987).
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state versus local control over the location of licensed liquor establishments. The fact that relatively few other states need to be persuaded that state level control is undesirable 0 can be taken as
testimony to the folly of attempting to regulate an entirely local
phenomena through a state level agency.
II.

THE PENNSYLVANIA LIQUOR CODE

Although this article is primarily concerned with the effect of the
Liquor Code's usurpation of local government's power to regulate
land use, a brief overview of the Act is warranted at this juncture
in order to better understand the context in which the problem of
state versus local control arises.
The Pennsylvania Liquor Code" is expressly designated as an
"exercise of the police power of the Commonwealth for the protection of the public welfare, health, peace and morals of the people
of the Commonwealth and to prohibit forever the open saloon. .... ''12
This statutory pronouncement has proved to be a harbinger of the
all pervasive nature of the Liquor Code. Shortly after the Code was
enacted in its present form, 3 it was held to be comprehensive in
intent, completely filling the field of liquor regulation. 14 A brief look
at the Code illustrates this comprehensiveness.
Article II of the Code creates the Pennsylvania Liquor Control
Board. The PLCB is an independent administrative board consisting
of three members appointed by the Governor, by and with the consent
of two-thirds of the state Senate. 5 Each member of the Board serves
a term of four years.

16

The Board has a chairman

7

and a secretary.

8

The chairman is appointed by and serves at the pleasure of the
Governor, while the secretary is appointed by the Board. The chairman receives a slightly higher salary than the remaining board mem-

10.

See ante note 120 and accompanying text.

11.

Presently codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47 (Purdon 1969 and Supp.

12.

Id. at § 1-104 (Purdon 1969).

13.

H. B. 1170, Act 1951, April 12, P.L. 90,

1987).
14. Appeal of Sawdey, 369 Pa. 19, 85 A.2d 28 (1951).
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 2-201 (Purdon Supp. 1987).
16. Id. Of the three original LCB members, one was to serve a term of two
years, one four years and one six years. All members now serve four year terms.
Id.
17. Id. at § 2-203 (Purdon Supp. 1987).
18. Id. at § 2-204 (Putdon Supp. 1987).
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bers, but enjoys no greater powers.' 9 The secretary enjoys only those
powers prescribed by the board.20
The Board is the instrument by which the Code is implemented
and enforced and its powers are far reaching. The Board has the
power, inter alia,:
a) To buy, import or have in its possession for sale, and sell liquor
and alcohol in the manner set forth in [the] act...;21
b) To control the manufacture, possession, sale, consumption, importation, use, storage, transportation and delivery of liquor, alcohol and
malt or brewed beverages... and to fix the wholesale and retail prices
at which liquors and alcohol shall be sold at Pennsylvania Liquor
Stores..

;22

c) To determine the municipalities within which Pennsylvania Liquor
Stores shall be established and the locations of the stores within such
municipalities

;21

d) To grant and issue all licenses and to grant, issue, suspend
and
24
revoke all permits authorized to be issued under this act.

19. Id. at § 2-203 (Purdon); 13 Op. Att'y. Gen. (1983)(The Liquor Code
envisions three coequal members of the Liquor Control Board, and the chairman is
distinguished from the other members only by his duty to preside at all meetings
of the Board.)
Each member of the LCB currently receives an annual salary of $40,000.00,
except the chairman, whose salary is $42,000.00. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 2-203,
(Purdon 1969) as amended by 1987 Pa. Legis. Serv. 43 (Purdon).
20. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 2-204 (Purdon 1969).
21. Id. at § 2-207(a). Section 2-207(a) was amended to address complaints of
consumers regarding relatively high prices and poor selection at Pennsylvania State
Stores. Section 2-207, as reenacted and amended by section 10 of Act 1987-14, now
contains the following language, "[T]he board shall buy liquor and alcohol at the
lowest price and in the greatest variety reasonably obtainable." In addition, subsection (b) was amended to read, "[Prices shall be proportional with prices paid by
the board to its suppliers and shall reflect any advantage obtained through volume
purchases by the board."
Other than the above amendments and an amendment to section 2-207(j)
allowing the use of consumer convenience items such as computer referral and
electronic fund transfers (ATM cards), section 2-207 was reenacted without change.
Thus, the LCB was renewed with the same farreaching powers it enjoyed prior to
the Liquor Code's expiration, with one exception. The exception is section 2-211,
which creates an independent liquor enforcement bureau within the state police.
Thus, under the new Code, the LCB no longer has the power to revoke licenses. It
did, however, retain the exclusive power to grant licenses and to approve the transfer
of existing licenses.
22. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 2-207(b) (Purdon Supp. 1987).
23. Id. at § 2-207(c).
24. Id. at § 2-207(d). Section 2-207(d) was amended to reflect the creation
of the independent enforcement bureau within the state police. Prior to amendment
the section read: "to grant, issue, suspend and revoke all licenses and permits. .. "
Section 14 of Act 1987-14, added section 2-211 and created the Bureau of Liquor
Control Enforcement within the Pennsylvania State Police.
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h) Without in any way limiting or being limited by the foregoing, to
do all such things and perform all such acts as are deemed necessary
or advisable for the purpose of carrying into effect
the provisions of
26
25
[the] act and the regulations made thereunder.
27
Article III of the Code establishes the Pennsylvania Liquor Stores,
or "State Stores" as they are more commonly known, and places
restrictions and limitations on their operation 2 and location. 29 Article

25. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 2-208(a)-(c), (e), (g)-(i) (Purdon 1969) and §2208(d) and (f) (Purdon Supp. 1985) the LCB has the power to make regulations
regarding:
(a) The equipment and management of Pennsylvania Liquor Stores and
warehouses in which liquor and alcohol are kept or sold, and the books and
records to be kept therein.
(b) the duties and conduct of the officers and employees of the board.
(c) The purchase, as provided in this act, of liquor and alcohol, and its supply
to Pennsylvania Liquor Stores.
(d) The classes, varieties and brands of liquor and alcohol to be kept and
sold in Pennsylvania Liquor Stores.
(e) The issuing and distribution of price lists for the various classes, varieties
or brands of liquor and alcohol kept for sale by the board under this act.
(f) The labeling of liquor and alcohol sold under (the) act...
(g) Forms to be used for the purposes of this act.
(h) The issuance of licenses and permits and the conduct, management,
sanitation and equipment of places licensed or included in permits.
(i) The place and manner of depositing the receipts of Pennsylvania Liquor
Stores and the transmission of balances to the Treasury Department through
the Department of Revenue.
() The solicitation by resident or nonresident vendors of liquor from Pennsylvania licenses and other persons of orders for liquor to be sold through
the Pennsylvania Liquor Stores and, in the case of nonresident vendors, the
collection therefrom of license fees for such privileges at the same rate as
provided herein for importers' licenses.
26. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §2-207 (Purdon 1969 and Supp. 1985).
27. Id. at § 3-301 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
28. Id. at § 3-302 (Purdon 1969) governs the selection of personnel, and §
3-303 governs management. Section 3-304 establishes hours of operation, and § 3305 governs, inter alia, whom sales may be made to, and the permissible manner
of payment.
29. Id. at § 3-301. This section provides in part that when the Board has
settled on a location for a State Store it must provide the municipality with notice
of its decision. In cities of the first class if the City Solicitor files a protest with
the court of common pleas that the location is objectionable because of its proximity
to a church, school, or private residence, the court will hold a hearing on the
protest. If the court finds that the proposed location is undesirable for the reasons
set forth in the protest, the board must find a new location. In cities other than of
the first class the same protests may be raised by petition of at least 15 taxpayers
residing within a mile of the proposed location. Id.
It is interesting to note here that, as will become evident infra, there is no
similar procedure available when a municipality, through its solicitor (or taxpayers
by petition), wishes to protest for identical reasons the licensing of a liquor
establishment other than a state store, such as a bar, tavern, or restaurant.
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IV, which will be the primary focus of the remainder of this article,
governs the licensing and regulation of the sale of liquor, alcohol
and malt and brewed beverages within the Commonwealth.3 ° Article
V covers distilleries, wineries, bonded warehouses, bailees for hire,
and transporters for hire.3 Finally, Articles VI, VII and VIII deal
with the forfeiture of property illegally possessed or used, distillery
bonded warehouse certificates, and the disposition of liquor license
fees, respectively. 2
Article IV establishes the various classes of liquor licenses that
may be granted by the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board. The
most prevalent class of license is the hotel, restaurant and club liquor
licenses. These establishments probably have the most direct impact
on surrounding communities, if for no other reason than that they
constitute the largest class of licenses. The regulation of this class of
license will be the focus of the remainder of this article. The licensing
and regulation of State Liquor Stores and other special license classes
is unfortunately, but necessarily, outside the scope of this article.
Sections 4-401 through 4-404 of the Code establish the basic
procedure for acquiring a hotel, restaurant or club liquor license. 3
The Commonwealth is divided into four licensing districts. 4 The
Board holds hearings on applications for new licenses and renewals
of existing licenses twice a year in each district.35 The hearings are
presided over by examiners appointed by the Board.3 6 These examiners
make their recommendations on each application to the Board and
the Board then makes the final decision to grant or deny a liquor
37
license to the applicant.
The Board has almost unfettered discretion in passing upon an
application. 38 Section 4-404 of the Code provides that upon receipt
of the application the Board may, in its discretion, refuse to issue a
license or approve a transfer if it finds that the proposed location is

30. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-401 et seq. (Purdon 1969 and Supp. 1985).
31. Id. at § 5-501 et seq.
32. Id. at § 6-601 et seq., § 7-701 et seq., and § 8-801 et seq.
33. Id. at §§ 4-401 - 4-404 (Purdon 1969 and Supp. 1985).
34. Id. at § 4-402 (Purdon 1969).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at § 4-404 (Purdon Supp. 1987).
38. Although the Code, as reenacted and amended by Act 1987-14, now
provides for enforcement and license revocation by the Liquor Enforcement Bureau
of the State Police, the granting of licenses for new establishments and the transfer
of existing licenses to new locations are still exclusively controlled by the LCB.
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within 300 feet of any so called "restrictive institution". 3 9 The Code
expressly defines a "restrictive institution" as any church, hospital,
charitable institution, or school or public playground. The Board, in
its discretion, may also refuse to issue a license or approve a transfer
where it finds that the proposed location is within 200 feet of any
existing licensed premises. 4° However, even if the Board finds that
the proposed location is within 300 feet of any restrictive institution,
or within 200 feet of another licensed establishment, it still has the
discretion to grant the license or approve the transfer. Such a finding,
however, does provide a conclusive basis, in and of itself, for denial
of the license or transfer. 4' The Board also has the discretion to
grant or deny a license to any person, or any officer or director of
a corporate applicant, whom it finds has been convicted of a felony
within the five years preceding the application. 42 The Board is only
mandated to deny an application where it determines that, in its
opinion, licensing the proposed location would be detrimental to the
welfare, health, peace and morals of the inhabitants of the neigh43
borhood within a radius of 500 feet.
Where the Board refuses to grant a new license or disallows the
transfer of an existing license, upon request by the applicant, it must
hold a hearing on its decision and explain the reason for its refusal."
The applicant may appear at the hearing in person, or by counsel,
and has the opportunity to present evidence in his/her behalf and to
cross-examine the witnesses presented by the Board. 45 If the Board
upholds its initial refusal it must notify the applicant by mail and
46
provide a brief written statement of the reasons for its refusal.
The applicant may take an appeal from the Board's refusal to the
court of common pleas of the county in which the proposed premises

39. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-404 (Purdon Supp. 1987).
40. Id.
41. See In re Application of Barone, 43 Pa. Commw. 446, 403 A.2d 148
(1979) (license granted even though location found to be within 300 feet of two
churches;) But cf, In re Appeal of Suburban Democrat Club, 73 Pa. Commw. 522,
458 A.2d 670 (1983) (denial of transfer of license solely because of proximity of
nine other licensed establishments within 200 feet); and Commonwealth v. Picciotti,
57 Pa. Commw. 529, 427 A.2d 270 (1981) (fact that a restrictive institution is
located within 300 feet of proposed location is sufficient, in and of itself, to support
the exercise of the Board's discretion in refusing an application.)
42. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-404 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
43. Id.
44. Id.at § 4-464 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
45. Id.
46. Id.
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are located. 47 In addition, where the Board grants a new license or
approves the transfer of an existing license, any church, hospital,
charitable institution, or school located within 300 feet of the proposed premises may take an appeal in the same manner. 48 Residents
of the neighborhood within a 500 feet radius of the premises are
also considered to have standing to challenge the Board's decision
on appeal. 49 However, although municipal governments may appear
before the Board and protest the granting of the license or transfer,
they do not have standing to challenge the Board's decisions.50
On appeal, the Common Pleas Court is empowered to review de
•novo the Board's determinations of fact and it may order or deny
the issuance or transfer of a license to the applicant.51 However, the
standard of review is abuse of discretion-the standard applied to
all administrative agency decisions-and the court may not supplant
the board's findings of fact with those of its own unless there is a
significant difference between the evidence presented to the court
52
and that presented to the Board.
Section 4-461 limits the number of retail liquor licenses that may
be issued in any one municipality to one license per two thousand
population, exclusive of airport restaurants, municipal golf courses,
hotels, privately-owned public golf courses, and clubs. 3 However,

47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Inhabitants of the neighborhood within 500 feet of the proposed premises,
although not specifically defined as "aggrieved persons" under PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
47, § 4-464 (Purdon Supp. 1985), have been determined to have the right to appeal
an adverse decision of the Board on the ground that they are persons with a "direct
interest" in the outcome of the Board's proceedings as that term is used in § 702
of the Administrative Agency Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 701 et seq. (Purdon
Supp. 1985). This direct interest is found to emanate from § 4-404 of the Liquor
Code, supra which directs the Board to refuse an application for a new license or
transfer if it believes granting the request would be detrimental to the welfare,
health, peace and morals of the surrounding neighborhood. See Gismondi Liquor
License Case, 199 Pa. Super. 169, 186 A.2d 448 (1962).
50. See Borough of White Oak v. Kusic, 7 Pa. Commw. 280, 299 A.2d 56
(1973).
51. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-464 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
52. See Thompson v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 22 Pa. Commw.
344, 348 A.2d 916 (1986); See also Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board v. Brock's
Cafe, Inc., 39 Pa. Commw. 597, 396 A.2d 74 (1979): "Before a Court may modify
or set aside Board actions, it must make findings of fact on the material issues
different from those made by the Board." Id. at 598, 396 A.2d at 75; and In re
Carver House, Inc., 454 Pa. 38, 310 A.2d 81 (1973).
53. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 54-461(a)(Purdon Supp. 1987). Section 4461(c)(Purdon 1969), which contains remarkably specific standards pertaining to
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this quota does not preclude the Board from renewing or allowing
4
the transfer of existing licenses within the municipality's boundaries.1
Municipalities desiring to allow more retail licenses than on per two
thousand population must obtain "resort" status from the Board.
Once the Board declares an area to be a resort it may then, in its
discretion, issue licenses above the section 4-461 quota.15 The issuance
of licenses over the quota is completely discretionary, and each
application is examined on a case-by-case basis to determine whether
there is an actual need for an additional licensed business. A need
for additional licenses is found where, in the Board's opinion, existing
license holders are not adequately equipped to supply the needs of
56
those frequenting the area.
The only provision for local control of the sale of liquor is found
in the "Local Option" established by section 4-472.17 Under this
section, any municipality may vote by referendum to prohibit the
granting of one or more classes of licenses within its boundaries. For
example, a municipality may prohibit the issuance of any club liquor
license, but allow State Stores and/or restaurant licenses. A petition
signed by at least twenty-five percent of the registered voters is
required to put the issue on the ballot, and the issue may not be
voted on more often than once every four years.5 A majority vote
is required to change a municipality from wet to dry, or vice versa,
with respect to any class of licenses. Where the municipal electorate
votes to prohibit any or all classes of liquor licenses, thereafter the
Liquor Board has no power to grant, or renew upon expiration, any
licenses of the prohibited class(es) within that municipality. 9
III.

A

CRITICISM OF THE PENNSYLVANIA LIQUOR CODE

As

IT

APPLIES TO THE LOCATION OF LICENSED LIQUOR ESTABLISHMENTS

A. The Community Perspective
As part of their general police powers, local governments in
Pennsylvania, as elsewhere, enjoy the power to regulate the use of
hotels not counted in determining whether this quota is met or exceeded. For
example, in order to be exempted from the one license per two thousand people
quota a hotel in a municipality having a population of between 10,000 and 25,000
must have at least thirty permanent guest bedrooms. §4-461(c)(3).
54. Id. at § 4-461(a) (Purdon Supp. 1987).

55. Id. at § 4-461(b) (Purdon 1969).
56. See Appeal of Willowbrook Country Club, Inc. 409 Pa. 370, 187 A.2d
154 (1962); In re Aiello, 41 Pa. Commw. 345, 399 A.2d 154 (1979); Pennsylvania
Liquor Control Board v. Struder, 20 Pa. Commw. 494, 342 A.2d 807 (1975).
57.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-472 (Purdon 1969).

58.
59.

Id.
Id.
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land within their political boundaries. 6° Local zoning ordinances and
comprehensive land use plans represent an intelligent and efficient
exercise of this power. Absent the adoption and enforcement of this
type of regulation, the disputes which arise from incompatible land
uses can only be resolved through the time and resource consuming
process of negotiation and litigation. 6' This usually takes the form
of one landowner claiming that his neighbor's use of his property
constitutes a nuisance, while the neighbor claims that he was "there
first," or that the utility of his use outweighs his neighbor's complaints. The delegation to local governments of the power to regulate
land use is a recognition of the peculiarly localized impact of unregulated land use. To be certain, some land uses are state or even
nation wide in import, but for the most part the effect of land uses
are felt most profoundly, if not exclusively, at the local level. 62 For
example, although urban blight may reflect state or even nation wide
economic woes, it depresses local land values and increases local
crime rates. These same effects on the state level are negligible, or
at most, cumulative in nature. Pennsylvania's Zoning Enabling and
Home Rule Acts recognize the local nature of land use problems

60. See ZONING ENABLING ACT OF 1929, P.L. 1551, § 1 et seq. PA. STAT.
tit. 53, § 14752 et seq. (Purdon 1969 and Supp. 1987). See also, Hadacheck
v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) in which the Court discusses the nature of the
police power in the context of local land use regulation, calling it "one of the most
essential powers of government." Id. at 410.
61. The much celebrated case of Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.
2d 219, 256 N.E.2d 870 (1970), is a good example of the problems inherent in a
case-by-case resolution of the problems created by incompatible land uses.
In Boomer, the New York Court" of Appeals agonized over the proper remedy
due the plaintiffs who were homeowners whose property had been permanently
damaged and devalued and whose health was threatened by defendant's nearby
cement plant. 257 N.E.2d at 871. The cement company's investment in the plant
was in excess of $45,000,000, and there were over 300 people employed there. Id.
at 873.
The court, after discussing several alternative remedies, refused to issue a
permanent injunction against the operation of the Defendant's plant, though New
York law at this time held that the plaintiffs were entitled. Instead, the court ordered
that an injunction would be granted unless the defendant payed permanent damages
to plaintiffs which would compensate them for the total economic loss to their
property present and future caused by defendant's operations. Id.
Boomer demonstrates the difficulty of devising proper and economically efficient
judicial remedies in nuisance cases and provides fuel for arguing in favor of
comprehensive land use regulation.
62. For example, national air and water pollution control legislation contains
land use control components, as do various state coastal zone management acts.
See "State and Regional Planning and Development Control," in MANDALKER,
PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT (1979), at 1207-70.
ANN.
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and, appropriately, allow for regulation at the local level. 63 However,
regulation of the location of establishments that sell liquor, an
obvious "use" of land, is placed beyond the reach of local governments. The Liquor Control Board has the exclusive discretionary
power to decide whether a prospective location is suitable for the
sale of liquor, whether the proposed use is as a quiet elegant
restaurant, or a night club featuring live bands six nights a week.
Local government's only source of control over the location of liquor
licenses is the "local option," or the regulation of land use generally
without using the sale of liquor as a basis for its classification of
permissible uses. In other words, while a municipality may exclude
the sale of liquor from an area by zoning it exclusively residential,
it cannot zone an otherwise commercial or mixed-use area "liquor
free.,"64
To better understand this anomalous effect of the Liquor Code's
licensing scheme, an examination of the case law interpreting this
aspect of the Code is necessary. In Appeal of Sawdey, 6 a frustrated
applicant for a liquor license attacked a zoning ordinance enacted
by the Township of Milcreek, Erie County, as being an invalid
exercise of the township's police power. The zoning ordinance established a "Mixed Occupancy" district where "[no] license for the
dispensing of intoxicating liquor in any form" was permitted. The
applicant was in the process of building a hotel in this "Mixed
Occupancy" district at the time the ordinance was enacted. 66 He
challenged the propriety of the zoning scheme, as it applied to him,
on the grounds that the legislation was prospective rather than
retroactive, and because he had made considerable expenditures in
reliance on a prior zoning ordinance that would have allowed the
sale of liquor at the hotel. Most importantly for our purposes,
however, the applicant also charged that the ordinance was in conflict
67
with the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Law.
The applicant argued that the "local option" was the only provision for local control made by the Act, and that the municipality

63. See supra note 60.
64. A local zoning ordinance may validly prohibit restaurants or other businesses in an area, but it can not regulate or prohibit the sale of liquor by restaurants
where they are a permitted use, Doolings' Windy Hill, Inc. v. Springfield Twshp.
Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 371 Pa. 290, 89 A.2d 505 (1952).
65. 369 Pa. 19, 85 A.2d 28 (1951).

66. See In re Appeal of Sawdey, 34 EsiE L.J. 134 (1950) for the facts
pertaining to the ordinance and appellant's hotel.
67. Liquor Control Act of June 16, 1937, P.L. 1762.
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could not circumvent the local option's referendum requirement by
enacting a zoning ordinance excluding liquor licenses. 68 On appeal
from the Board's denial, the Court of Quarter Sessions upheld the
ordinance, finding "[a]mple appellate authority for the conclusion
that municipalities may, by zoning regulations, restrict the sale of
intoxicating liquors in certain areas within the municipal boundaries. 69
However, on appeal from an affirmance by the Pennsylvania
Superior Court, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in an opinion
penned by Justice Ladner, struck down the local zoning ordinance
holding that:
[Miunicipalities may not invade the field of regulation which the State
legislature has completely filled by its comprehensive liquor control
act, an act that provides ample means to all communities to obtain
prohibition at their option by vote of the people thereof. A municipality may not in the70guise of a zoning ordinance regulate the business
of dispensing liquor.
It is somewhat disconcerting to note that this momentous pronouncement was made rather off-handedly by the court, through
Justice Ladner. The primary rationale for the court's decision was
not the preemption rational expressed above. Most of the court's
opinion is devoted to the argument that the regulation of the dispensing of liquor has no reasonable relation to the municipality's
police power, thereby making this ordinance invalid as an improper
exercise of that power. The court noted that:
Conceding that a zoning ordinance may properly exclude hotels and
taverns, like any other business, entirely from a residential area,
(citation omitted) .

.

. an entirely different question is presented when

it is attempted to regulate the details of the hotel business which it
permits ...

Zoning ordinances, interfering as they do with the free use of
property, depend for their validity on a reasonable relation to the
police power. (citation omitted.) An ordinance for example if it permitted a butcher shop to be located in an area but prohibited its sale
of pork, or a drugstore but prohibited its sale of candy, or a grocery
store but prohibited its sale of bread, would surely be regarded as
unreasonable legislation on details of a business not a matter of public
concern. If it may prohibit a hotel from dispensing liquor, it can well

68.
69.
70.

34 ERIE L.J. at 136.
Id. at 137.
369 Pa. at 26, 85 A.2d at 32. (emphasis in original).
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forbid it selling meals, or cigars or candy, or7 newspapers. Zoning
ordinances may not be used for such purposes. '
This logic is glaringly flawed. First, the relation between the
regulation of the sale and consumption of intoxicating beverages and
the health, welfare and safety of the municipal residents is selfevident. In fact, the Liquor Code itself makes this point. The Code
is expressly designated as an "[e]xercise of the police power for the
protection of the public welfare, health, peace and morals of the
people of the Commonwealth. ' 72 Furthermore, the analogy drawn
by the court is not a good one. Since pork, candy and bread are
innocuous items, their sale has no adverse effect on the public welfare
independent of the use of the property as a butcher shop, candy or
grocery store. In order to be a proper exercise of the police power,
then, regulation of one of these uses must be predicated on the
nature of the business and its effect on, or inconsistency with, the
use of the surrounding property. On the other hand, it is the nature
of liquor and other intoxicating beverages, not the general use of
the property as a hotel, that affects the public health and welfare.
Granted, the medium of dispensing liquor is not irrelevant. But it is
the potential adverse effect of the sale and consumption of alcohol,
in and of itself, that provides the justification for regulating its sale
as a land "use." The "local option" provision of the Code implicitly
recognizes this by allowing a municipality to permit restaurants or
hotels, but prohibit them from selling alcohol. 7
The court's holding, that excluding the sale of liquor is not a
proper exercise of the municipal police power, is not convincing and
subsequent decisions ignore this aspect of the opinion. 74 It is the

71.

Id. at 25-26, 85 A.2d at 31-32.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 1-104 (Purdon 1969).
73. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
74. See In re Obradovich's Appeal, 180 Pa. Super. 383, 119 A.2d 839 (1956);
Doyle v. Springfield Twnshp. Bd. of Comm'rs, 394 Pa. 49, 145 A.2d 695 (1958);
and Township of Spring v. Majestic Copper Corp., 435 Pa. 271, 256 A.2d 859
(1969), all striking down local zoning ordinances on the grounds that the regulation
of the sale of alcoholic beverages is under the exclusive province of the Liquor
Control Board. Although all of these cases cite Sawdey, none of them mention the
impermissible regulation of a business use rationale of that decision. All of these
cases cite Sawdey only for the proposition that "a municipality may not in the guise
of a zoning ordinance regulate the business of dispensing liquor." 369 Pa. at 26,
85 A.2d at 32. (emphasis in original).
See also Altieri v. Zoning Hearing Bd., Twshp. of North Huntingdon, 30 Pa.
Commw. 511, 376 A.2d 261 (1977), which cites only Spring Township v. Majestic
Copper Corp., supra, as authority for the above proposition. Thus, the untenable
logic of the court's primary holding in Sawdey has been neatly swept under the rug.
72.
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court's alternative holding, that the liquor control act preempts the
local police power, that has become the basis for striking down local
zoning ordinances attempting to create "liquor free" districts.
The court's dissatisfaction with its "improper-use-regulation" rationale is first evident in In re Petition of Hilovsky.75 Hilovsky dealt
with a Butler Township ordinance which provided that land and
building within a certain commercially zoned district could be used
for any purpose, excepting, inter alia, the sale of liquor or spirits.
The plaintiff held a restaurant liquor license and wished to transfer
it to a restaurant property he owned in the commercial district. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down the ordinance, noting in
passing that it constituted an attempt to regulate the details of a
business. The court, however, clearly relied more on the preemption
rationale and its concern that zoning provided means by which local
governments could skirt the referendum requirement of the code's
local option:
Once it be conceded that a municipality by a zoning ordinance could
prohibit any hotel or restaurant from selling liquor within any or all
of a number of designated districts it is conceivable that the local
authorities could thereby effectively establish prohibition within the
borders of the local option as provided in . . . the liquor code. [T]hat
code ... constitutes a comprehensive enactment designed for the
complete control and regulation by the State of the dispensing of
alcoholic beverages.
In short, the dispensing of liquor is a matter that has been wholly
taken over by the State, and local regulations by way of zoning
76
restrictions cannot interfere with its supreme authority in that field.
If the court's primary concern was that local governments could
effectively institute prohibition without putting the matter to the
electorate, it certainly went overboard in its attempt to safeguard
against this possibility. In both Sawdey and Hilovsky the local
ordinances prohibited the sale of liquor only in particular districts.
In Sawdey the "Mixed Occupancy" district in which the sale of
liquor was prohibited constituted less than one percent of the total
land area of the township. 77 The court could have satisfied this
concern by merely holding that any local zoning ordinance establishing liquor-free zones could not be administered arbitrarily or discrim-

75.
76.
77.

379 Pa. 118, 108 A.2d 705 (1954).
Id. at 121-22, 108 A.2d at 706-07.
34 EnM L.J. at 135.
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free zones could not be administered arbitrarily or discriminatorily, 78
or that any ordinance that did not make provision for the location
of liquor establishments in at least one land use district was invalid. 79
If, on the other hand, the court did in fact conclude that it was
the intention of the Legislature that the Liquor Code should completely fill the field of liquor regulation, it still had ample grounds
available to uphold the local land use regulations. For example, the
Indiana Alcoholic Beverage Control Act 0 provides in pertinent part
that "a city or town shall not enact an ordinance which in any way
directly or indirectly regulates, restricts, enlarges, or limits the operation of the holder of a liquor retailer's permit as provided in this
title.' '81
A clearer expression of a Legislature's intent to preempt local
powers to regulate liquor could hardly be imagined. The Indiana
Courts, however, recognize the subtle, yet important, distinction
between the state government's power to control the sale and consumption of liquor and the local government's power to regulate the
use of land to sell or consume liquor. Thus, the Indiana Appellate
Court in O'Banion v. State ex. rel Shively8 2 held that the above
quoted section of its Liquor Control Act did not prohibit a munic-

78.

See Pantry, Inc. v. City of Pigeon Forge, Tenn. , 681 S.W.2d 23 (1984),
TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 57

applying the Tennessee Alcohol Beverage Control Act,

(1975).
79. See UTAH CODE ANN. §s 1-6(b) (1985). This section of the Utah Alcoholic
Beverage Control Act defines the powers and duties of the Liquor Control Commission and provides in pertinent part:
(a) State stores or package agencies shall not be located in violation of any
valid zoning ordinance of any city, town or county of this State. Zoning
ordinances which do not make provisions for the location of state stores and
package agencies in one or more zones, shall be deemed invalid for purposes
of this section.
80. IND. STAT. ANN. tit. 7 (1985).
81. Id. at § 3-9-6.
82. 146 Ind. App. 223, 253 N.E.2d 739 (1970). Nor is this decision an
anomaly as other state courts facing state liquor legislation conferring exclusive
regulatory powers on a state board have reached the same result. See, e.g., Karp v.
Zoning Bd. of City of Stanford, 456 Conn. 287, 240 A.2d 845 (1968); Banknote
Club and Stan's Boilermaker v. City of Dallas, Tex. Civ. App. , 608 S.W. 2d 716
(1980); Hardage v. City of Jacksonville Beach, Fla. , 399 So.2d 1077 (1981); Powell
v. Board of Comm'rs of Rds. and Revenues, 234 Ga. 183, 214 S.E.2d 905 (1975).
But cf" Cannon v. City of Syracuse, 72 Misc. 2d 1072, 340 N.Y.S.2d 944 (1973)
(City zoning regulation invalid as preempted by State Alcoholic Beverage Control
Law); and City of Lyndhurst v. Compola, 112 Ohio App.2d 483, 169 N.E.2d 558
(1960) (Power to regulate location of restaurants does not authorize the prohibiting
of alcohol in particular restaurant since such regulation would conflict with state
regulation of the sale of liquor.
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ipality from limiting the use of land within designated districts with
respect to the sale of alcoholic beverages. This holding recognizes
that local ordinances regulating the use of land do not intrude upon
the State's power to regulate liquor. Liquor still can not be sold
without a state license, and every aspect of the operation of a licensed
liquor establishment is still regulated exclusively by the State. For
example, the local government could not allow the sale of liquor to
minors, nor could it allow establishments to operate after the closing
time designated by the State. The local government can only, attendant to its power to regulate the use of land, dictate that certain
locations are not suitable for the operation of liquor establishments.
Unfortunately for Pennsylvania residents, the Pennsylvania Courts,
for whatever reason, have not adopted this approach. In Pennsylvania, local governments can not regulate in any manner the location
of liquor establishments within their borders.83
As was briefly discussed in Part II of this article, section 4-464 of
the Pennsylvania Liquor Code gives certain "restrictive institutions"
4
the right to appeal adverse decisions of the Liquor Control Board.
In addition, residents of the neighborhood within a 500 feet radius

83. The Liquor Code as interpreted by the courts does not stop here, however.
In addition to preempting local land use regulations, the Liquor Code empowers
the Liquor Control Board to regulate activities incidental to the operation of a
liquor establishment. The Board, pursuant to its power to enact rules and regulations
necessary to the implementation and enforcement of the Code, has enacted a myriad
of regulations governing activities related to the sale of liquor. Activities that, absent
their somewhat irrelevant connection to the sale of liquor, are obviously more
matters of local than state concern. For example, in Hude v. Commonwealth, 55
Pa. Commw. 1, 423 A.2d 15 (1980), the appellant had been fined for a violation
of the following Board regulation:
No licensee shall use or permit to be used inside or outside of the licensed
premises a loudspeaker of similar device whereby the sound of music or other
entertainment, or the advertisement thereof, can be heard on the outside of
the licensed premises. 40 PA. ADMIN. CODE 5.32(a) (Shepard's 1986).
In upholding this regulation, the Commonwealth Court held:
The validity of a liquor-related state regulation rests upon the state's plenary
power to control the sale and use of alcoholic beverages by virtue of the
twenty-first amendment to the United States Constitution.
Pa. Commw. 55 at 3, 423 A.2d at 16.
It is questionable how great an interest the state has in ensuring that neighborhood residents enjoy a quiet environment. It certainly would seem that local
government is better suited for this task. It is also interesting to note that this same
interest is not considered legitimate, or at least pressing enough, to allow a local
government to enact a zoning ordinance intended to "ensure a peaceable environment
by excluding altogether liquor licensed establishments from a particular land use
area."
84. Supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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of the proposed location have been determined to have standing to
appeal under the Administrative Agency Law as persons directly
interested in the board's decision.85 The origin of this interest can be
found in section 4-404 of the Code which directs the Board to refuse
an application for a new license or transfer if it believes that granting
a license for the proposed location would be detrimental to the
6
welfare, peace and morals of the inhabitants of the neighborhood.1
Thus, the residents of the neighborhood are expressly recognized to
be effected by, or have an interest in, the licensing of a nearby
location to sell liquor. This provision is a recognition of the impact
that a liquor establishment may have on the immediate neighborhood.
Property values may decline and crime rates may rise. Parking may
be inadequate and local streets may not be able to handle the
increased traffic. These problems are not certain to occur, but they
do represent just some of the possible externalities associated with
the licensing of a location.
Unfortunately, a perusal of the reported cases involving neighborhood dissatisfaction with the LCB shows that this provision is insufficient to protect community interests. First, because the
municipality itself has no right to appeal, local residents wishing to
protest the granting of a license must themselves appear at the Board
hearings. If the residents do not appear before the Board they are
barred from appealing its decision.8 7 Therefore, in order to protest
the licensing of a location, residents must be aware of the application
as well as the procedures that must be followed. The notice required
to be given to area residents is in the form of a sign placed on the
proposed premises and containing, inter alia, the following language:
TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC:
If you wish to protest this application, write directly to the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, Bureau of Licensing, Harrisburg, Pa.
17214. It is required that you reside within a radius of 500 feet of the
premises proposed to be licensed. Should a hearing be held, and
provided you have notified the board as outlined, you will be notified
of the date, time and place. A protest is not considered
valid unless
8
the protestant appears and testifies at the hearing.1

85.

Supra note 49 and accompanying text.

86.

See supra note 43 and accompanying text; Gismondi Liquor License Case,

199 Pa. Super. 619, 186 A.2d 448 (1962); Hindsley v. Di Giandomencio, 26 Pa.
Commw. 121, 362 A.2d 1144 (1976).
87. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 47, § 4-464 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
88. 40 PA. ADMIN. CODE 3.11 (Shepard's 1987).
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In addition to the obvious underinclusiveness of the 500 feet
limitation, the above paragraph highlights several other problems
with relying on this process as the only means for community input
to the Board's licensing decision. First, the Board is not required to
hold a hearing on the license application at all. The Board may
simply approve the application upon the recommendation of the local
Enforcement District Office.8 9 If this is the case, any protest must
be made directly to the court of common pleas in the form of an
appeal from the Board's decision. 90 Awareness of this avenue of
redress and its effective use requires the advice of counsel. Unfortunately, this route may not be available to all neighborhood residents, or even to all neighborhoods. The foresight to retain and the
ability to pay counsel is more likely to exist in more affluent
neighborhoods. As a result, while higher income neighborhoods may
be able to make effective use of the code's provision for judicial
review, the degree to which this adequately protects lower income
neighborhoods is dubious.
Moreover, the 500 feet limitation is especially burdensome on less
affluent neighborhoods. Any one resident of a lower income neighborhood can hardly be expected to challenge the Board's decision
on his/her own. The expense of procuring counsel would surely be
prohibitive. In addition, as legal aid services are usually seriously
understaffed and underfunded, they may be either unwilling or unable
to devote the required time and energy to challenge the Board.
Therefore, residents must turn to pooling their limited resources,
usually in the form of community-interest groups organized to represent the residents before the Board or court.
In addition to the considerable organizational skills required to
make effective use of this approach, obtaining standing to challenge
the Board's decisions can become a problem. Because it is "not
sufficient to assert a common interest of all citizens in procuring
obedience to the law" 9' and "the relationship between the challenged
action and asserted injury must be direct and immediate, ' 92 a community group that does not have any members residing within the
statutory 500 feet radius could not obtain standing to challenge the

89. Id. at § 4-464.
90. Id.
91.

William Penn Parking Garage v. City of Pittsburgh, 464 Pa. 168, 192,

346 A.2d 269, 280-81 (1975) (plurality opinion).

92. Independent State Store Union v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board,
495 Pa. 145, 432 A.2d 1375, 1380 (1981).
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Board. This is because, under the Code, the Board must only concern
itself with the impact on that portion of the neighborhood within
the 500 feet radius of the location. 93 Thus, any adverse effects felt
outside of this area, as attested to by members of the community
group, are not to be considered by the Board. A community-wide
organization in this situation would not be "directly interested" in
the Board's decision and would not-have standing under the Administrative Agency Law. 94 Such a situation is not hard to imagine. It
is entirely foreseeable that a tavern could be placed in a transitional
area where a small business district meets a surrounding residential
area and no homes are located within 500 feet of the tavern. In such
a situation it is highly disingenuous to argue that the residential area
would not be affected by an unwanted tavern merely because it is
more than 500 feet away. Yet, under the Pennsylvania Liquor Code,
only those residents of the neighborhood who live within 500 feet of
the proposed location may protest.
Even assuming such an organization exists, is able to obtain
standing, and can procure counsel, it still faces the unenviable task
of challenging the Board. The initial factual determination of whether
the issuance of a license will adversely affect the surrounding neighborhood is made by the Board. 95 It is only after the Board determines
that such an adverse impact will occur that it is statutorily precluded
from issuing the license. 96 This is a critically important point because
the Board in making its determination enjoys the luxury of the highly
deferential standard of review afforded all administrative agencies.
Even though the court conducts a de novo review, it may not
substitute its own findings of fact for those of the Board, absent a
significant difference between the evidence presented to the court
and that presented to the Board. 97 If no new evidence is presented,
the Court may only consider whether the Board abused its discretion
in granting the license. 98
A good illustration of how difficult it is to overcome this standard
of deference is In re Application of Barone.99 In Barone, a transfer

93.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47,

§ 4-404, see also supra note 43 and accompanying

text.
94.
95.
96.
97.
on appeal
98.
99.

See ante note 49.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-4-4.
Id.
See, e.g., In re Chiavaroli, 54 Pa. Comrnmw. 588, 422 A.2d 1195 (1980),
after remand, 452 A.2d 289 (1982).
Id. at 150 n.5.
43 Pa. Commw. 446, 403 A.2d 148 (1979).
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of a restaurant liquor license to a premises located within 300 feet
of a church was approved over the objection of both the church and
nearby residents. After conducting a de novo review of the Board's
findings, the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County reversed
the Board. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court reinstated the Board's decision, holding that the evidence before the
common pleas court was not sufficient to allow the court to substitute
its findings for that of the Board. At the hearing before the Board,
the church had shown evidence establishing:
a) that the Church was within 300 feet of the premises proposed to
be licensed; b) that the Church preached and practiced temperance; c)
that the premises to be licensed were visible from the Church; 3) that
there was litter on and surrounding the proposed premises; and f) that
residents within 500 feet of the proposed premises objected to the
transfer. 100

On appeal before the common pleas court, the church offered
additional evidence suggesting:
1) that the premises were located in an area of heavy automobile
traffic; 2) that the applicants had offered to make a "donation" to
the Church in exchange for its dropping its objections to the license
transfer; and 3) that there had been at least two incidents of fighting
on the premises in which knives were thrown, both involving at least
one of the applicants. 0 1
The common pleas court held that this evidence, when considered
in conjunction with the evidence originally presented before the
Board, was enough to establish a detrimental effect on the neighborhood. The commonwealth court disagreed, and in holding the
common pleas court's reversal to be an abuse of discretion stated:
Evidence of a hazardous traffic condition does not prove that the
transfer of a license permitting the sale of malt liquors to the location
will be adverse to the public welfare, nor does one or two incidents
of rowdy behavior prove immoral and untrustworthy character when,
as here:
a) There is no substantial evidence establishing a correlation between
the sale of malt beverages and increased traffic problems; (and)
b) There is no finding, either implicit or explicit .

.

. that the (appli-

cants) were of bad moral character or that they individually or collectively constitute a threat to the community. 102

100.
101.
102.

Id. at 450 n.5, 403 A.2d at 150 n.5.
Id. at 451, 403 A.2d at 150.
Id., See also Paxon Maymar, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board,

11 Pa. Commw. 136, 312 A.2d 115 (1973); and Parks v. Pennsylvania Liquor
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Particularly discouraging to anyone considering challenging the
granting of a license is the court's treatment of the church's argument
that licensing the proposed premises would create a traffic hazard.
In dismissing this argument, the court suggests that in order to be
successful, a protestant challenging the Board's decision on these
grounds must be able to affirmatively establish a correlation between
the sale of liquor at a particular location and an increase in accidents,
or hazardous conditions, in the vicinity of the premises. 0 3 In all
likelihood, this requires hiring someone to conduct a study; an added
expense which will discourage many local residents from formally
protesting the licensing of a location. Furthermore, once again,
poorer neighborhoods can neither afford undertaking such a study,
nor the sophisticated legal assistance that will recognize the necessity
of conducting such a study in the first place.
Barone highlights another problem with the present Liquor Code;
or at least what is seen as a problem from the community perspective.
Under the Code, the Liquor Control Board is entrusted with determining whether licensing a particular location will be detrimental to
the welfare, health, safety and morals of the residents of the nearby
neighborhood.' °4 This implicitly requires that the Board first determine the "local morality," as well as what the community requires
to safeguard its health, safety and welfare. To the extent that the
Board is unable, or unwilling, to make such a determination on a
community-by-community basis, it must apply a uniform definition
of health, safety, morals and welfare. In either instance, this would
seem to place the determination of local mores and values in the
hands of state officials not necessarily in tune with the local community's views. It would certainly seem that local elected officials,
as representatives of the community, would be better judges of the
welfare, health, safety and morality of the local citizenry. Attitudes
towards the virtues of temperance and pleasures of alcohol certainly
differ from community to community. But more importantly, the
problems associated with the sale and consumption of alcohol also

Control Board, 44 Pa. Commw. 87, 403 A.2d 628 (1980):
[TIhere is no legal correlation between the availability of alcoholic beverages
and dangerous driving per se, and the evidence in the record is insufficient to
show any such correlation.
Id. at 91, 403 A.2d at 631.
103.

Parks v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 44 Pa. Commw. at 90,

403 A.2d at 631.
104.

See ante notes 40 and 44 and accompanying text.
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differ among communities as well as between locations within a single
community. The current Liquor Code ignores this when it places
exclusive control over the location of liquor establishments in the
state Liquor Board.
The most plausible reason for this distrust of local government is
a concern that a "not-in-my backyard" attitude would be fostered
by more localized control over liquor licensing. In other words, there
is a fear that local government would take the attitude that bars and
taverns were desirable, but in nearby communities rather than at
home. Thus, the major justification for eschewing local control
appears to be the supposed independence of the state Board. In
theory at least, the Board as an independent agency should be
impervious to local political pressure. Hence, the Board should be
able to objectively determine whether a particular applicant and
location are suitable to be licensed to sell liquor. The Board, unlike
local officials, should not be subject to pressure from local tavern
associations seeking to limit their competition, or from crusading
temperance groups out to "save" the community from the evils of
alcohol. However, it is naive to argue that the Board is immune
from political pressure. Furthermore, any advantages that stem from
the Board's relative independence are far outweighed by its demonstrated insensitivity to legitimate local concerns.
A good example of the Board's susceptibility to political pressure
is Centrum Prime Meats, Inc. v. PennsylvaniaLiquor Control Board.01o
In Centrum, the petitioner had applied for a liquor license for his
Philadelphia restaurant and was denied based on the Board's finding
that (1) the proposed premises were within 200 feet of another licensed
establishment and within 300 feet of a hospital, and (2) that granting
the license would adversely affect the surrounding neighborhood. 106
On appeal from an affirmance by the court of common pleas, the
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court overturned the Board's decision
after finding that the Board in making its determination had- bowed
to the political pressure brought to bear by local officials. The court
found that at the same time the board denied the petitioner's application it had granted a license to a location within 200 feet of the
petition's proposed site. The "existence" of this licensed establishment was then cited by the Board as one of the reasons for its denial
of the petitioner's application. The court could find no grounds for

105.

71 Pa. Commw. 560, 455 A.2d 742 (1983).

106. Id. at 562, 455 A.2d at 743-44.
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distinguishing between the two locations other than the fact that
several local elected officials expressed concern over the one location
and some involved parties had financial interests in the other location.

107

The point that should be drawn from this example is not that local
officials are not to be trusted. The point is that state licensing
officials are not insulated from political pressure merely because they
are appointed rather than elected. The most effective safeguards
against improprietous decision-making, whether by state or local
officials, are clear standards by which such decisions are to be made,
and judicial review of such decisions to ensure that they are made
in line with these standards. Thus, perhaps the most serious problem
with the present Code is that the almost unfettered discretion given
the Board, when coupled with the lack of clear standards governing
its decision-making, renders judicial review an ineffective safeguard
in most cases. 108
B.

The Licensee's Perspective

The purchase of a restaurant or tavern under the current Liquor
Code can be a very uncertain prospect. Unless a person buys an
existing establishment, he faces the task of either applying for a new
license or buying an existing license and transferring it to his location.
The limitations placed on the number of licenses allowed in any one
municipality makes the prospect of obtaining a new license improb-

107. Id. at 565-66, 455 A.2d at 745.
108. The legislature apparently recognized the potential for influence peddling
by the LCB while debating its renewal. Act 1987-14 amended section 2-210 of the
Liquor Code by adding subsections (c) through (n), which provide, in pertinent part:
(c) No person convicted of an infamous crime may be employed as a member
or employe by the board or enforcement bureau.
(d) No member or employe of the board or enforcement bureau may use his
position with the board or enforcement bureau, or any confidential information
received through his position with the board or enforcement bureau, to obtain
financial gain, other than compensation provided by law, for himself, a
member of his immediate family or a business with which he is associated.
(e) No person may offer or give to a member of the board or enforcement
bureau or a member of his immediate family or business with which he is
associated, and no member of employee of the board or enforcement bureau
may solicit or accept anything of value, including a gift, loan, political
contribution, reward or promise of future employment, based on an understanding that the vote, official action or judgment of the member or employe
of the board or enforcement bureau would be influenced thereby.
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able in most cases.' °9 The prospective tavern or restaurant owner is
thus relegated to buying and transferring an existing license. Often
times the fledgling entrepreneur is forced to buy the location before
a license can be procured and its transfer approved. Because the
Board has such broad discretion in granting or denying licenses and
transfers, applicants can not be certain whether their proposed location will be deemed suitable. They must, therefore, hedge their
transactions. To protect against owning a tavern without a liquor
license, prospective barkeeps must buy property on the condition that
a license transfer is later granted. This can have the undesirable
effect of restraining the alienability of commercial real estate.
For example, the Board may in its discretion grant or deny a
license application whenever it finds that the proposed premises are
within 300 feet of any "restrictive institution," or within 200 feet of
another licensed establishment. 10 Although such a finding, in and of
itself, supports a denial of a license,"' the Board may still issue a
license despite the existence of a restrictive institution or another
establishment." 2 Where a restrictive institution or another licensed
establishment is found to be present within the prohibited zones, the
Board need not find that to issue the license would be detrimental
to the public welfare in order to deny its issuance." 3 The mere
existence of the restrictive institution or licensed establishment within
the prohibited zone is, in and of itself, sufficient reason to deny the
license. The upshot of this is that even where there is no opposition
to licensing an establishment, the Board is free to deny the license
application." 4 In fact, the Board does not even have to comment on
109.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-461 (Purdon Supp. 1985) limits the number

of retail licenses available in each municipality to one for each two thousand
inhabitants, exclusive of licenses granted to airport restaurants, municipal golf
courses, and hotels.
110. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-401 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
111. Commonwealth v. Picciotti, 57 Pa. Commw. 529, 427 A.2d 270 (1981);
In re Chiavaroli, 54 Pa. Commw. 588, 422 A.2d 1195 (1980); Inc. Liquor License
Case, 179 Pa. Super. 235, 1116 A.2d 79 (1955) allocatur refused 179 Pa. Super.
XXVI; Har-Bell, Inc. Liquor License Case, 176 Pa. Super. 206, 107 A.2d 572
(1954).
112. See Appeal of Suburban Democrat Club, 73 Pa. Commw. 522, 458 A.2d
670 (1983).
113. See Prezioso v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 36 Pa. Commw. 92,
387 A.2d 1308 (1978); Elks of the World Summit Lodge No. 115 v. Pennsylvania
Liquor Control Board, 30 Pa. Commw. 526, 374 A.2d 747 (1977); Jack's Delicatessen, Inc. Liquor License Case, 202 Pa. Super. 481, 198 A.2d 604 (1964).
114. Home Aid Association v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 25 Pa.
Commw. 271, 360 A.2d 834 (1976); Inc. Liquor License Case, 179 Pa. Super. 235,
116 A.2d 79 (1955); House Liquor License Case, 174 Pa. Super. 618, 106 A.2d 865
(1954).
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its reasons for denying a license once it shows the presence of another
establishment or a restrictive institution." 5 Moreover, as previously
discussed, judicial review of the Board's decision is highly deferential
6
and largely of no avail to the frustrated applicant."
7
Appeal of Suburban Democrat Club" is a good example of the
inconsistency exhibited by the Board and the uncertainty faced by
license applicants. In Suburban Democrat Club, the Club, a private
social organization, applied to transfer a club liquor license to a
building located in a commercial area. Within 200 feet of the proposed site were nine other licensed establishments. The Board denied
the transfer solely because of the proximity of the other establishments. Both the court of common pleas and the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court affirmed the Board's decision, concluding that the
Board had not abused its discretion. In so holding, the court rejected
the Club's argument that because the Board had granted so many
other licenses within 200 feet of each other, it was an abuse of
discretion to refuse its application on that basis. Quoting from a
previous case the court wrote:
The applicant's assertion that the Board's abuse of discretion is clearly
manifested by its lack of consideration of the fact that the same
proximity of two hundred feet apparently served as no impediment to
the previous grant of licenses to the other three licenses [sic] fails to
take into account the Board's discretion as to where to draw the line
as to how many, if any, licenses may be permitted within two hundred
feet from each other." 8
The Board, is therefore, empowered to decide when and where to
"draw the line" with respect to granting licenses within the restrictive
areas prescribed in the Code. Granting such broad discretion in the
application of these standards defeats altogether one of the purposes
of having such standards in the first place; to provide guidelines by
which license applicants will be able to discern whether a particular
location will be suitable. The only mandatory standard with regard
to the location of liquor establishments is the "detrimental effect"
on the surrounding neighborhood proviso. 1 9 However, what entails

115. In re Chiavardi, 54 Pa. Commw. 588, 422 A.2d at 1195; Application of
Barone, 43 Pa. Commw. 446, 403 A.2d 148 (1979).
116. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
117. 73 Pa. Commw. 522, 458 A.2d 670 (1983).
118. Id. at 524-25, 458 A.2d at 671, quoting from Pennsylvania Liquor Control
Board v. Parker, 56 Pa. Commw. 486, 425 A.2d 853 (1981).
119. See ante note 38 and accompanying text.
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a "detrimental effect" is not defined by the Code, rather this
determination is left to the Board.' 20 Therefore, whether the Board
will make such a finding the basis for its denial is no more predictable. As a result, prospective business owners have very little to go
by when surveying a site for its potential as a suitable location for
a liquor establishment. It is submitted that clear, relatively uniform
standards enacted by local governments in conjunction with their
general powers to enact and enforce ordinances would go a long way
toward remedying this uncertainty. Moreover, local ordinances governing the location of liquor establishments would better protect
those most affected by such decisions-the local residents.
Criticism of the present Liquor Code would be disingenuous if no
replacement was suggested. Fortunately, there exists a myriad of
alternative regulatory systems currently in place in other states. In
fact, only four other states' 21 have liquor control laws which provide

120. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
121. Delaware, New York, Ohio and South Carolina. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 4,
§ 101 et. seq. creates the Delaware Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission. Section
304 of the Code vests the Commission with the exclusive power to grant or deny
liquor licenses. Section 543, like section 4-404 of the Pennsylvania Code, presents
the grounds for refusal of a license. Refusal is within the Commission's discretion
if any of the enumerated grounds are found to exist. Section 543 (a) appears to
defer to the governing powers of the municipality, stating: "(a) [t]he Commission
shall refuse to grant a license to be used in any county or subdivision thereof, if
contrary to any prohibitory law then if force in such county or subdivision thereof."
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 543(a) (1985).
However, a proviso to this section notes that it supports denial of a license
only when the "prohibitory law" is a result of an exercise of the power granted
under Art. XIII, § 1 of the Delaware Constitution-the "local option" which may
not be exercised through town ordinance, but only through referendum.
New York, Ohio and South Carolina are considerably more straightforward in
their delegation of exclusive regulatory powers to the State licensing agency:
(1) State regulation preempts local government's power to legislate in the field
of the regulation of establishments which sell alcoholic beverages, People v. DeJesus,
54 N.Y.2d 465, 445 N.Y.S.2d 207, 430 N.E.2d 1260 (1981); TJPC Restaurant Corp.
v. State Liquor Authority, 61 A.D.2d 441, 402 N.Y.S.2d 483, aff'd 48 N.Y.S.2d
896, 400 N.E.2d 1348 (1978); City zoning regulation invalid as preempted by N.Y.
ALco. BEV. CONT. LAW, § 64-a, (McKinney 1985), Cannon v. City of Syracuse, 72
Misc.2d 1072, 340 N.Y.S.2d 944 (1973).
Section 30-43 of the New York Law does, however, set up Local Alcoholic
Beverage Control Boards in every county (except the boroughs of New York City)
which make recommendations to the State Liquor Authority on whether to issue or
deny license applications made within each county. The local Boards, however, serve
a merely advisory role.
(2) OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 303.21 and 519.21 (Page 1985) provides that
county or township boards of zoning appeals, or other local officials, are precluded
from prohibiting the sale of use of alcoholic beverages in areas where the establish-
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for exclusive state regulation of the location of licensed premises.
The remaining states all provide for varying degrees of more localized
control.
IV.

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

Up to this point we have considered only the liquor licensing
system in Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania system, however, is but
one of many different types of regulatory systems now in place in
the several states. As discussed ante, Pennsylvania's system provides
for virtually no local control over the location of licensed establishments. It is advantageous to now examine some of those systems
that do provide for local control.
It should be kept in mind that local control is not an end in itself.
Local control is only desirable if it can be implemented in such a
way as to effectively protect the legitimate concerns of local residents,
while at the same time safeguarding the interests of liquor business
owners. To accomplish these dual and sometimes conflicting objectives a regulatory system must provide clear standards by which
prospective licensees can realistically gauge their chances of obtaining
a license for a particular location. In addition, it must provide
adequate procedural protections against its discriminatory application
by local officials and against its use as a substitute for prohibition
by local referendum. Finally, any proposed regulatory legislation
should be sensitive to the fact that many smaller communities may
not be able to shoulder the financial burden of implementing a local
licensing system. Some provision for a "default" licensing agency,
usually a county agency, is typically included to address this problem.
Recommending any one system, or category of systems, as the
"best" in terms of being a replacement for Pennsylvania's current

ment and operation of any retail business, hotel, lunchroom or restaurant is
permitted, Lyndhurst v. Compola, 112 Ohio App. 483, 169 N.E.2d 558 (1968).
(3) S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-13-760 (Law. Co-op 1976)
All [conflicting] ordinances of towns and cities . . . [are] suspended it being
hereby declared that the State has occupied the field of the subject . . . [of
liquor regulation]; judicial and police officers of towns and cities shall enforce
such provisions within their respective jurisdictions.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-3-730: (Law. Co-op (1977)
The Commission shall refuse to grant any license . . . if it shall be of the
opinion that:

(2) The store or place of business to be occupied by the applicant is not a
suitable place . . .
S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-3-410: (Law. Co-op 1977) The Commission shall have
sole and exclusive power to grant, issue, suspend and revoke all licenses . . .
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system is somewhat unrealistic. Even assuming that State legislators
would agree to enact a regulatory system providing for more local
control over the location of bars and taverns, any such system in its
final form would likely represent a mosaic of various aspects of the
systems in place in other states. Nevertheless, Pennsylvania legislators
could profit greatly from a consideration of the alternative regulatory
systems set forth below and the way in which they provide for more
localized control over the location of businesses licensed to sell
alcoholic beverages.
A.

State Liquor Boards with Exclusive Licensing Powers,
But Subject to the Power of Local Government
to Regulate Land Use

This approach to regulating the sale and consumption of liquor
appears to be the most popular among the states. Nineteen states
122
have enacted this basic regulatory scheme in one form or another.
In general, the regulatory statutes in this category all provide for
state liquor boards or commissions with the exclusive power to
"control the possession, sale, transportation and delivery of alcoholic
beverages", and to "grant, issue and suspend or revoke for cause
... liquor licenses and alcohol permits."'1 23 Thus, the powers entrusted to the state licensing authorities under this scheme are virtually
24
the same as those enjoyed by Pennsylvania's Liquor Control Board.
However, these states, either through express statutory provision or
judicial interpretation, allow local governing bodies to establish "liquor free" or "liquor restricted" districts which are honored by the
state licensing authority.

122. Alabama, ALA. CODE § 28-1-1 et seq. (1985); Alaska, ALASKA STAT. §
04.11.010 et seq. (1985); Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 48-101 et seq. (1985);
California, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23000 et seq. (West 1985); Connecticut,
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-1 (West 1985); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 561.01 et
seq. (West 1985), Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 7-1-1-1 et seq. (Burns 1985); and
O'Banion v. State ex rel. Shively, supra; Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 410101 et seq.
(1985); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26-01 et seq. (West 1985); Mississippi,
MIss. CODE ANN, § 67-1-1 et seq. (1985); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 311.010 et
seq. (Vernon 1985); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 16-1-101 et seq. (1985); Nebraska,
NEB. REV. STAT. § 53-101 et seq. (1984); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN § 60-3-1
et seq. (1985); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN tit. 37, § 501 et seq. (West 1985);
Texas, TEX. ALco. BEV. CODE ANN § 1.01 et seq. (Vernon 1978), and Banknote
Club and Stan's Boilermaker v. City of Dallas, TEX. Crv. App. , 608 S.W.2d 716
(1980), Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 32-1-1 et seq. (1970); West Virginia, W.VA. CODE
§ 60-7-4a (1984); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. S 125.10(3) (West Supp. 1985).
123. For example, see ALA. CODE § 28-3-43(2) & (3) (1985).
124. Compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 2-207 (Purdon 1969).
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An example of this type of regulatory arrangement is California's
Alcoholic Beverage Control Act.1 25 Section 23790 entitled "Retailer's
License; Zoning" states, "No retail license shall be issued for any
premises which are located in any territory where the exercise of the
rights and privileges conferred by the license is contrary to a valid
zoning ordinance of any county or city."
The California Act is explicit in its reference to local zoning
ordinances. The inference to be drawn from this is that while local
governing bodies may regulate the location of retail liquor establishments, regulation of the operation of such establishments is within
the exclusive province of the state liquor authority.
Missouri, on the other hand, grants local governing bodies broad
regulatory powers with respect to the "regulation and control of the
sale of all intoxicating liquors within their limits. 1 ' 26 The broad
language employed by the Missouri statute does not appear to limit
local ordinances to the regulation of the location of liquor establishments. Instead, it at least arguably gives local governing bodies the
power to regulate all aspects of the operation of liquor establishments.
The Act does, however, contain a proviso that local ordinances may
not be inconsistent with the provisions of the State liquor control
laws. 27 Nevertheless, this broad grant of regulatory power would
seem to invite local governments to test its limits, resulting in
uncertainty with regard to the validity of local regulations more
restrictive or more lenient than those provided by State law.
This uncertainty due to non-uniformity could produce several
undesirable situations. First, municipalities might begin competing to
attract licensed businesses by enacting less restrictive ordinances,
especially with regard to operating hours.2 8 Or, particularly temperate
communities could enact restrictive ordinances that would unfairly
stifle local liquor businesses. It is true that both over restrictive and

125. CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23790 (West 1985).
126. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 311.010 (Vernon 1985).
127. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 311.220(2) (Vernon 1985).
128. Varying local closing hours is a particularly dangerous situation because
of the likelihood of encouraging, or at leastfacilitating, late night "bar hopping"
between municipalities. As the bars in town"A" close at 1:00 a.m., some patrons
will travel to town "B", where the bars do not close until 2:00 or 3:00 a.m., and
then back home to town "A" after closing. With the current crackdown on drunk
driving, this type of situation would draw heated criticism.This can obviously be
avoided by establishing uniform, or at least maximum, operating hours.
The Missouri Act sets a uniform closing time of 1:30 a.m., with the exception
of Kansas City and St. Louis where closing time is 3:00 a.m. Mo. STAT. ANN. §§
311.174 and 311.290 (1985).
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under restrictive local ordinances can be challenged as repugnant to
the state liquor laws. However, it is exactly this type of uncertainty
that we are presently attempting to remedy. Prospective business
owners, rather than take the time and expense to mount a legal
challenge to a local ordinance will, in most cases, simply look for
another location in a nearby town or city. Local residents, on the
other hand, will most often simply not be aware of the legal basis
for challenging an overly lenient local regulation; or, if they are
aware, simply unwilling or unable to bear the burden of financing a
lawsuit on behalf of all local residents.
Thus, simplicity and straightforwardness are the greatest assets of
liquor control laws like California's that limit local government to
regulating just the location of liquor establishments. Prospective
tavern owners can easily discern which districts allow the sale of
liquor, and when coupled with clear licensing standards much of the
uncertainty as to the suitability of a particular location is removed.
From the community perspective, local authorities can include the
control of liquor in their comprehensive land use plans to avoid some
of the problems associated with incompatible land uses. Moreover,
when faced with an area with rising crime rates and other alcohol
related social problems, local authorities can at least consider "zoning
out" problem bars.129 Local officials may also, through zoning regulations, prohibit "uses" incidental to the operation of a liquor
license, such as entertainment incompatible with the nature of the
surrounding neighborhood. In addition, aggrieved residents would be
better able to seek redress through the political process. Local officials
unsympathetic to neighborhood problems stemming from the existence of a "problem" bar, or the sale of liquor in general, could
simply be voted out of office, or more likely, be the target of political
pressure from community groups. It is much less expensive to or-

129. Where the local government's actions rise to the level of a taking, then
of course this would require the compensating of bar owners for the "taking" of
their business. This is usually done by paying business dislocation damages. See
Redevelopment Auth. of City of Philadelphia v. Lieberman, 461 Pa. 208, 336 A.2d
249 (1975) (Licensed premises condemned and licensee unable to find suitable
alternative location or to sell license. Court held liquor license is "property" and
lost value of license must be included in just compensation.) While under the present
system a municipality may still exercise its power of eminent domain, see Lieberman,
supra as a result of In re Sawdey, and its progeny, it cannot rezone an area to
exclude liquor sales.
In addition, where the sale of liquor is zoned-out retroactively, taverns in
existence at the time the zoning, regulation was changed would have to be allowed
to continue as non-conforming uses.
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ganize to bring political pressure to bear on local officials than it is
to institute litigation.
However, deferring to local land use regulation does not alleviate
one particular problem. The state liquor authority still has the sole
power to suspend or revoke licenses. Therefore, local land use
regulations are of little assistance when the neighborhood problems
are due to the nature of a particular bar, rather than its location.
For example, if the neighborhood residents' complaint is that a
particular bar draws rowdy patrons who cause damage after hours,
re-zoning the area to exclude all bars is clearly an overreaction. On
the other hand, zoning out the particular bar complained of would
be improper and invalid as spot zoning. 3 0
What is needed is some provision for receiving and acting upon
community complaints. Missouri's Liquor Control Act contains such
a provision. Under the Missouri Act, complaints may be brought by
local officials, police officers, sheriffs, or by any eight or more
taxpayers of the county on any of the following grounds:
1. Selling to visibly intoxicated persons;
2. Knowingly permitting any prostitutes or person of ill repute to
frequent the premises;
3. Permitting disorderly conduct on the premises;
4.

Selling unauthorized intoxicating liquors;

5. Selling intoxicating liquors to minors;
6. Selling intoxicating liquors after hours."'
The complaint is made to the district office of the Supervisor of
Liquor Control who then requires the licensee to show cause why
his/her license should not be suspended or revoked. 13 2 Either party,
the license or complainant, may then appeal an adverse decision by
33
the Supervisor to the county circuit court.
In the alternative, several states require that the local governing
body approve the granting of a new license, or the renewal of an
existing license, prior to approval by the State liquor authority. 3 4 As
130. See Appeal of Mulac, 418 Pa. 207, 210 A.2d 275 (1965); Cleaver v. Bd.
of Adjustment of Tredyffrin Twp., 414 Pa. 367, 200 A.2d 408 (1964).
131. Mo. STAT. ANN. § 311.710 (Vernon 1985).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Alabama, ALA. CODE § 28-3A-11 (1985); and South Dakota, S.D. CODIMED LAWS ANN. § 35-2-12 (1977), provide that no state license shall be issued
without local approval. These regulatory systems will be considered in depth in the
next section. Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-201(c) (1985); North Carolina,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-901 (1983); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT.§ 471.210(3) (1981);
and Texas, TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 11-41A (Vernon 1978) all provide for
non-binding local recommendations or disapprovals as one factor to be considered
by the state authority when deciding whether to issue or renew a license.
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will be discussed in the next section, this system is subject to local
abuse if applied without limitation. However, if the permitted grounds
for local disapproval are limited, the local governing body is required
to state its reasons for disapproval, and some provision is made for
administrative or judicial review of the local decision, then a provision
for local disapproval can be an effective weapon with which to
135
confront particular problem bars.
B.

State Liquor Boards with Exclusive Licensing Powers,
But with Provisionfor Local Recommendations

Six states have enacted liquor control laws that require some form
of favorable recommendation from the local governing body prior
to the issuance of a license by the state liquor authority, 136 while
four states provide for non-binding recommendations. 137 For example,
North Carolina's Alcoholic Beverage Control Act provides, 38 with
respect to the issuance of permits:
§ 18B-901.

Issuance of permits.

(b) Notice to Local Government.-Before issuing an ABC (Alcoholic
Beverage Control) permit for an establishment, the Commission shall
give notice of the permit application to the governing body of the city
in which the establishment is located. If the establishment is not inside

135. The Pennsylvania Legislature, in reenacting the Liquor Code, has created
the Bureau of Liquor Control Enforcement. The Bureau is part of the Pennsylvania
State Police and is empowered to enforce the Code and any regulations promulgated
pursuant thereto. Section 2-211, Act 1987-14, 1987 Pa. Legis. Serv. No. 2, 59-61
(Purdon). Also created by Act 1987-14 is the Office of Administrative Law Judge.
Section 2-212, Act 1987-14. Under the new Act, all enforcement hearings are brought
before the A.L.J.
Although created in response to political pressure to provide for swifter enforcement of the liquor control laws, the new § 2-211 does not delineate the Bureau's
powers with respect to complaints concerning problem bars. The Bureau is empowered to "investigate" the unlicensed sale of liquor, the sale of liquor to minors,
and other violations of the Liquor Code, see 47 P.S. §§ 4-491, 4-492 and 4-493 for
specified prohibited conduct.
Section 4-491, as amended, now provides that the Bureau, "upon sufficient
cause shown," may within one year of the violation or cause appearing, cite "the
offending licensee to appear before an A.L.J to show cause why his/her license
should not be revoked or a fine imposed, or both. Assuming that citizen complaints
may provide "sufficient cause shown," the new § 4-491 appears to be identical to
§ 311.710 of the Missouri Liquor Control Act.
136. See supra note 133.
137. Id. In these states the local recommendation is but one of several factors
the State licensing authority is to consider in making its determination.
138. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 18B-901 (1983).
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a city, the commission shall give notice to the governing body of the
county. The Commission shall allow the local governing body 10 days
.. . to file written objections to the issuance of the permit. To be
considered by the Commission, the objection shall state the facts upon
which it is based.
(c) Factors in Issuing Permit.-Before issuing a permit, the Commission shall be satisfied that the applicant is a suitable person to hold
an ABC permit and that the location is a suitable place to hold the
permit for which he has applied. To be a suitable place, the establishment shall comply with all applicable building and fire codes. Other
factors the Commission may consider in determining whether the
applicant and the business location are suitable are:
1) The reputation, character, and criminal record of the applicant;
2) The number of places already holding ABC permits within the
neighborhood;
3) Parking facilities and traffic conditions in the neighborhood;
4) The kinds of businesses already in the neighborhood;
5) Whether the establishment is located within 500 feet of a church
or public school or church school;
139
6) Zoning laws;

7) The recommendation of the local governing body;'4° and
8) Any other evidence that would tend to show whether the applicant

would comply with the ABC laws and whether the operation of his
business at that location would be detrimental to the neighborhood;
(d) Commissioner's Authority.-The Commission shall have the sole
power, in its discretion, to determine the suitability and qualification
of an applicant for a permit.
The last part of this section presents the main problem with this
approach. Although the factors that the State authority may or even
139. It is uncertain from the face of the statute whether this reference to local
zoning laws means that local governments may zone certain areas "liquor free", or
that zoning laws are merely a factor in determining the suitability of the location,
i.e., whether the proposed location is in an area zoned commercial, residential,
industrial, etc.
The language employed in subsection (d) and section 18B-100 ("Except as
provided in this Chapter, local ordinances establishing different rules on the sale
. . . of alcoholic beverages, or requiring additional permits or fees, are prohibited.")
suggests that the latter interpretation is the more plausible. Nevertheless, for present
purposes it is sufficient to simply assume that the latter interpretation is the correct
one.
Arizona and Oregon also appear to preclude direct local regulation of the
location of liquor establishments: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-112 (1987), (State
Liquor Board with exclusive power to license and regulate sale of liquor); OR. REV.
STAT. § 472.040 (1981), (Inconsistent municipal charter enactments or local ordinances repealed; Act intended to operate uniformly throughout state.

Texas, on the other hand allows local governments to regulate the location of
liquor establishments through their general police powers. See Banknote and Stan's
Boilermaker v. City of Dallas.
140. Id. (emphasis added).
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should consider are detailed by the Act, which of these are in fact
considered, and, the weight each factor is to be given is left to the
discretion of the Commission, as is the ultimate decision to grant or
deny a license. Without examining the Commission's decisions it is
impossible to say whether the local recommendation provision is
anything more than a salve for community concerns. However, even
assuming the sincerity of this provision, making the consideration of
the local government's recommendation merely discretionary defeats
much of the purpose of allowing for local input and, once again,
leaves applicants in the dark with regard to the suitability of a
location.
The primary advantages in incorporating the regulation of the
location of liquor establishments into the general ordinances of a
municipality are two-fold. First, the locational decision is made up
front, before an applicant invests time and money into finding and
buying a location. Second, locational decisions are not made in a
vacuum without consideration of the overall land use patterns in the
community. Instead, the appropriate location of liquor establishments
is thought out as part of-the community's comprehensive plan. Both
of these elements are lacking in the local recommendation scheme,
especially when no other provision is made for local input or control.
Regardless of the weight given by the State authority to local recommendations, this system does little to correct the uncertainty regarding
the suitability of a particular location. The State authority's decision
is still made on an ad hoc case-by-case basis, and there is no guarantee
that the same factor will be given the same weight in different cases.
As a result, prospective licensees will have to closely examine past
decisions, which are most likely unreported, in an attempt to discern
what the Commission is likely to consider important. This system,
then, provides no clearer standards to guide prospective tavern owners
than does the Pennsylvania Act. Thus, this category of regulatory
system would add little as a substitute for Pennsylvania's present
system, except to possibly soothe local communities by deceptively
appearing to give them a voice in licensing decisions.
C.

State Licensing Boards with Local Approval Also Required

Liquor control systems requiring local approval of license applications come in essentially three forms: those requiring local approval
before the state authority may issue a license; 1 4 1 those providing that
141.

Alabama,

ALA. CODE

§ 28-3A-11 (1985); Iowa,

IOWA CODE ANN.

(West 1985); South Dakota, S.C. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 35-2-1.2 (1977).

§ 436.17
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the state liquor board may issue a license only after the applicant
obtains a license from the local liquor board; 142 and those that create
both independent local and state licensing authorities, but do not
make the issuance of a local license a precondition to obtaining a
state license.' 4 All three of these systems are considered together
here because despite their slight differences in administrative procedure they all essentially provide local government with a veto power
over the State liquor authority.
Three states have in place liquor control laws requiring approval
of license applications by the local governing body prior to issuance
of a license by the State. 144 South Dakota's Liquor Control Act is a
good example of this type of system:
All applications for retail licenses ... shall be submitted to the
governing board of the municipality within which the applicant intends
to operate, or if outside the corporate limits of a municipality, to the
board of county commissioners ... The governing board shall have
discretion to approve or disapprove the application depending on
whether it deems the applicant a suitable person to hold such license
and whether it considers the proposed location suitable. ,
Under this scheme, when the local governing board disapproves
an application the state authority is precluded from issuing a license. 4 6 Where it approves, the application is forwarded to the State
authority, which then has the discretion to approve or disapprove
the license. 14 7 While this system provides for greater local control
over the location of liquor establishments, it does so only by giving

142.

Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-47-107(4) (1985); Illinois, ILL. ANN.
§ 109 (Smith-Hurd 1985); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 436.17
(1985); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 5-02-01, 5-01-02(5) (1985).
143. Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 23-916 (1985); Minnesota MINN. STAT. ANN. §
340.12 (West 1985); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-17(4) (1985); New
Jersey, N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33:1-94, 33:1-85 (West 1985); New Mexico, N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 60-6b-4(A), (H) & (G) (1985); Virginia, VA. CODE § 4-38 (1956);
STAT. ch.43,

Wyoming, Wyo. STAT. § 12-4-101 (1977 and Supp. 1985).
Kentucky's liquor control law provides for as many as three licensing authorities,
city, county and state, and contains extremely detailed regulatory provisions. Each
of the three licensing authorities has the power to license and regulate, provided
that city and county regulations may be no stricter than state regulations, and are
subject to approval by the State Liquor Board. Ky. REV. STAT. § 241.101 et seq.
(1985).
144. See supra note 133, Note that Alabama only requires "local approval"
for retail lounge liquor licenses. ALA. CODE ANN. § 28-3A-11 (1985).
145. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 35-2-1.2 (1977).
146, Id. at § 35-2-5.1.
147. Id. at § 32-2-5.2.
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local officials a "veto" power over State licensing decisions. This is
not a constructive form of local control as it does not allow local
governments to incorporate the location of licensed businesses into
their overall land use plan, and to the extent that it does, i.e., by
allowing local governing boards to consistently deny or grant approval
in predesignated areas, it is an inefficient substitute for, or duplication
of, local land use regulations. Moreover, the provision for forwarding
applications to the State authority for final approval subjects local
land use controls to unnecessary state review. From the applicant's
perspective, this regulatory scheme merely injects one more set of
decision makers whose sentiments he/she must try to predict. This
is especially troublesome where, as in the case of the South Dakota
statute cited as an example, the regulatory statute does not specify
the grounds on which the local governing authority may properly
"veto" an application.148
A provision for local approval without uniform standards is also
subject to the same criticism advanced ante regarding local regulation
of the sale of liquor other than its mere location. 49 That is, local
governments may begin to compete to attract businesses by perfunctorily approving all applications, or, conversely, they may systematically deny all applications, thereby, in the extreme situation, effectively
instituting prohibition without a local referendum. Admittedly, the
South Dakota Act does attempt to guard against the former by
providing for final approval of all licenses by the State authority.5 0
One final criticism of this licensing plan is that if legislators are
genuinely concerned that local officials are too susceptible to political
pressure to institute a local licensing scheme fairly, this system and
those that provide for complete local control over licensing are clearly
politically unpalatable. While it would appear to be erroneous to
assume that local officials are quite so malleable, this type of system
is nonetheless subject to abuse. Regulating the location of taverns
and other liquor establishments in conjunction with the regulation
of land use in general, however, is not as subject to abuse, as the
locational decisions are made without reference to a particular applicant.

148. Section 35-2-1.2 of the South Dakota Act merely provides:
The local governing board shall have discretion to approve or disapprove the
application depending on whether it deems the applicant a suitable person
• . . and whether it deems the proposed location suitable.
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 35-2-1.2 (1986).
149. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
150. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 35-3-12 (1977).
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Several states provide for local licensing boards and require either
that the applicant obtain a local license prior to being issued a state
license, or merely that the tavern owner possess both licenses concurrently.' 51 Other than providing an added source of revenue for
local governments, creating local licensing bodies would seem to add
little to the current licensing scheme in Pennsylvania. If state licenses
are.to be granted as a matter of course whenever a local license can
be produced then this regulatory design is subject to the same criticism
made of local "veto" powers.112 If, on the other hand, local and
state licensing authorities make truly independent licensing decisions,
this system unduly subjects applicants to an additional set of regulations and requires the payment of additional licensing fees.
Although liquor control systems requiring local approval are subject to certain criticisms, the concept of local approval does contain
considerable merit. Moreover, most of the problems identified as
being associated with local approval are easily remediable, unlike
some of the problems inherent in pure state level control. In fact,
the "best" system of liquor control appears to be one which combines
local approval with a general deference to the power of local government to regulate land use. Although endorsing any one state's
system as the "best" method of liquor control is not a central aim
of this article, any such "best" system would probably look very
much like the Iowa Beer and Liquor Control Act.'
Iowa's Beer and Liquor Control 5 4 Act is administered by a state
agency, the Iowa Beer and Liquor Control Department.'
This
Department is headed by the Beer and Liquor Control Council which
is charged with the power to grant, deny, revoke or suspend liquor
and beer permits. 5 6 Local control over the location of retail liquor
and beer establishments, including restaurants and taverns, is provided for by conditioning the granting of a state license on approval
from the local government. 5 7 This allows local input as to the
suitability of a particular applicant. It also empowers the local
government to act on behalf of its citizens, rather than forcing the
citizens to organize to protect themselves. If the local authority

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

See supra notes 134 and 135.
See supra notes 25-26.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.1 et seq. (West 1985).
Id.
Id. at § 123.4 (West 1985).
Id. at § 123.16 (West 1985).
Id. at § 123.32 (West 1985).
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approves an application, the State director investigates the applicant
and, after a hearing, issues final approval or disapproval.158 If the
local authority disapproves, the application is returned and the applicant may take an appeal as of right to the State Hearing Board.15 9
If the Hearing Board determines that the local authority acted
arbitrarily or without reasonable cause, it must reverse the local
authority and order the issuance of a license. 16 Judicial review of
the Hearing board's determination is also provided. The applicant as
well as the local authority are given the right to appeal the deter161
mination to the county court.
This provision for local approval is invaluable as it addresses the
problems outlined earlier regarding neighborhood complaints concerning a particularbar rather than its location. 162 The local renewal
requirement allows residents to complain to their local government
which can then refuse to approve the renewal of the club's license.
Conversely, providing for administrative review of the local authority's exercise of this power (and then judicial review of the admin63
istrative determination) safeguards against the abuse of this power.1
The Iowa Act also authorizes local governments to "adopt ordinances or Regulations [controlling] the location of the premises of
retail beer and liquor control licensed establishments."' 64 As previously discussed, this authorization is a crucial element in any effective
regulatory process. 165
The Iowa Act is subject to one substantive criticism, however,
While the Iowa Act authorizes municipal regulation of the location
of licensed establishments, its attempt to reserve the regulation of all
other aspects of the liquor industry to the state authority falls short
of the clear standards this article has proposed. The relevant portion
of the Iowa Act provides that:
Local authorities may adopt ordinances or regulations for the location of the premises of retail wine or beer and liquor control licensed
establishments and local authorities may adopt ordinances, not in
conflict with this chapter and that do not diminish the hours during
which beer, wine or alcoholic beverages may be sold or consumed at

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at § 123.32(3) (West 1985).
Id. at § 123.32(4) (West 1985).
Id.
Id. at § 123.32(5) (West 1985).
See ante notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
IowA CODE AN. § 123.32(5) (West 1985).
Id. at § 123.39 (West 1985).
See text accompanying notes 125-30.
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retail, governing any other activities or matters which may affect the
retail sale and consumption of beer, wine and alcoholic liquor
and the
66
health, welfare and morals of the community involved.
First, although this section explicitly denies local governments the
power to shorten the operating hours of liquor establishments within
their borders, it implicitly allows them to lengthen those hours. As
was previously discussed, 167 non-uniformity in operating hours has
the potential of creating serious problems, most notably, increasing
drunken driving. Furthermore, the reference to "ordinances ...
governing

. . .

activities

. . .

which may affect the

. . .

health, welfare

and morals of the community" . . . is overly broad as arguably every

activity incidental to, or associated with, the sale of alcohol has the
potential of affecting the health, welfare or morals of the community.
More explicit parameters on the local government's power in this
regard are desirable in order to avoid uncertainty as to the validity
of local ordinances enacted under this section.
Finally, the Iowa Act is also sensitive to the concerns of small
municipalities which may not be able to handle the financial and
administrative burden of implementing a local licensing scheme.
Because the local government's control is passive-it regulates through
ordinances and by issuing an approval or disapproval of an application-it is not required to create and finance a new governmental
agency or administrative plan. The government framework in place
can easily handle this passive role in the liquor licensing process.
Land use regulations pertaining to the sale of liquor are merely
enacted and implemented through the zoning code and the comprehensive land use plan already in place. Likewise, approval or disapproval of an application can be handled by the Council in
conjunction with its other daily governmental duties. Council is
already equipped to hear testimony on the issues it votes on and the
approval or disapproval of liquor licenses would merely be one more
issue on which it votes. Since the actual issuance of the license and
enforcement of the liquor regulations are handled by the State agency,
there is little added burden on the municipality even though its
control is greatly increased.
In conclusion, the Iowa Act, while by no means the perfect liquor
control act, does incorporate many of those elements identified as
necessary to providing effective local control over the location of

166.
167.

IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.39 (West 1985).
See ante note 121.
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liquor establishments. Control that is necessary to effectively confront
the local problems associated with "problem" bars, as well as those
problems which arise when the sale of liquor is incompatible with
surrounding land uses. As was shown earlier in this article, the
Pennsylvania Liquor Code exacerbates these problems by denying
local control altogether. The Iowa Beer and Liquor Control Act, if
nothing else, provides a good framework for constructing a replacement for the Pennsylvania Liquor Code, especially when certain
elements of the other Acts surveyed-such as the Missouri Act's
provision allowing complaints from local residents and government
officials 168 and the Utah Act's provision prohibiting the use of zoning
ordinances as a means of skirting prohibition by local referendum- 169 are incorporated into this framework.

168.
169.

See ante note 131 and accompanying text; M.C.A. § 311.710.
See ante note 79.

